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This study provides preliminary insights into the linguistic features
that contribute to Internet censorship in mainland China. We col-
lected a corpus of 344 censored and uncensored microblog posts
that were published on SinaWeibo and built a Naive Bayes classifier
based on the linguistic, topic-independent, features. The classifier
achieves a 79.34% accuracy in predicting whether a blog post would
be censored on Sina Weibo.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
As the Internet continues to be an integral part of people’s lives,
more than half the world’s Internet users are still having restricted
access to information on the World Wide Web due to censorship.
Our study takes a closer look at the censorship activities in main-
land China, with a particular focus on one of its mainstream social
media platforms – Sina Weibo. Internet censorship in mainland
China consists of several layers: restricted access to certain web-
sites, restricted access to certain search results, and removal of
some information published by Internet users. Since censorship
on social media typically happens after a user has successfully
published on the platform, what gets censored or not is largely a
“real-time" decision due to the unpredictable nature of published
content. Discussions on sensitive topics do not always get censored,
as evidenced by their accessibility on the platform. This study inves-
tigates the factors that contribute to censorship on Sina Weibo from
a linguistic perspective. We locate sources that provide censored
and uncensored Weibo texts, extract linguistic features from the
corpus we collected and build a classifier that predicts censorship
independent of discussion topics. It is hoped that by gaining insight
into the linguistic features that contributes to censorship, social
media users can better maneuver their text content to circumvent
censorship.
2 RELATEDWORK
Internet censorship has dramatically increased over the past five
years and reports suggest that more than half of the world’s Internet
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users live in a country where the Internet is censored or restricted
[1]. While there have been significant efforts to develop strategies
and technologies for evading censorship ([8]) , results from existing
research fall short in delivering a number of essential aspects of
online censorship. Many measurement and circumvention studies
focus more on exploiting technological limitations with existing
routing protocols ([5, 10, 11, 17]). While there have been many
significant contributions in this area, little attention has focused on
linguistically-inspired techniques to study online censorship. One
notable exception applies linguistic steganography to obfuscate
censored content [16]. Their results focus purely on circumvention
while this research takes a linguistic approach to detect censorable
content and thereby provides insight into evading censorship "lin-
guistically".
In recent years, several detection mechanisms have been pro-
posed to observe and categorize the type of content and keywords
that are censored ([7, 18]). [6] analyze the content of censored and
uncensored texts from various Chinese social media sources to
study the relationship between criticism of the state and chance of
censorship. Their main findings suggest that negative comments
about the state did not always lead to censorship. Rather, the pres-
ence of Collective Action Potential (the potential to cause collective
action in real life) in a text is what rendered a post susceptible
to censorship. [9] explored the effectiveness of linguistic tactics
in circumventing online censorship in China and argued that us-
ing parodic satire could most likely survive censorship because
it relies heavily on users’ and censors’ ability to detect sensitive
topics based on context. Similar to [9], the empirical study con-
ducted by [2] discovered linguistically-informed ways to better
survive the Chinese censorship. Their findings showed that the use
of homophones of censored keywords on Sina Weibo could help
extend the time a Weibo post could remain available online. The
findings of [2, 6, 9] are all based on a significant amount of human
effort to interpret and annotate texts to evaluate the likeliness of
censorship. However, in case of change in censorship approach
or direction imposed by the authority, time- and labor-intensive
methods might not be efficient enough to inform Internet users the
latest censorship environment.
Our work is similar to [15] on automatic fake news detection, we
are interested in devising ways to automatically predict censorship
by examining what a machine can learn from the linguistic signals
embedded in existing data and how well the learning can generalize
to out-of-sample data. We see fake news and censorable content
detection as two related tasks: to inform Internet users ways to
strive for a free, open, and reliable online information exchange
platform.
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3 DATASET
To investigate linguistic features that might contribute to censor-
ship, we need a corpus that consists of both censored and uncen-
sored texts in order to analyze and compare the linguistic signals
embedded in each category. Since our goal is to build a classifier
that predicts censorship regardless of topics, a set of censored and
uncensored texts needs to be relevant to the same topic in order to
offset the effects of topics on censorship.
Our corpus contains censored and uncensored posts about Bo
Xilai, a former Communist Party chief in Chongqing, China. In
2013, Bo Xilai was a likely candidate for promotion to the elite
Politburo Standing Committee. However, he was found guilty of
corruption and was expelled from the Communist Party, parliament
and faced prosecution. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. His
wife was given a suspended death sentence for the murder of a
British businessman, Neil Heywood, in 2012. The Bo Xilai incident
has spurred a lot of discussion on misconduct of Chinese political
leaders and the Party. Only posts published between January 1,
2015 to January 1, 2018 were collected.
3.1 Uncensored Data
Sina Weibo is regarded as one of the most popular social media plat-
forms in mainland China. It functions similarly as Twitter where
users can publish, reblog and repost opinions and news on any
topics. Although users can publish freely on Weibo, the published
content is subject to scrutiny and would possibly be censored or
deleted if it is considered to be violating Weibo’s policies. Content
that can be found on Sina Weibo has already passed the censor-
ship mechanisms and is regarded as uncensored. We collect 152
uncensored posts from Weibo using the search keyword 薄熙来
(Bo Xilai).
3.2 Censored Data
FreeWeibo (https://freeweibo.com/) is a website dedicated to mak-
ing censored Weibo posts available to the public. We collect 192
censored posts from FreeWeibo on the same topic published be-
tween January 1, 2015 to March 1, 2016. This date range is shorter
than that of the uncensored data since the number of available un-
censored posts is significantly less than that of censored. Therefore,
a longer date range of uncensored posts is used in order to create a
more balanced corpus. Below are some examples of censored and
uncensored posts with their English translations:
Censored: 薄熙来是今天的高岗，周永康是今天的康生，两位都是为
党和国家立下汗马功劳的人，也都是被政治斗争构陷的人。
Bo Xilai is today’s Gao Gang. Zhou Yongkang is today’s Kang Sheng. They
both made great contributions to the Party and the country. They both got
framed by political infighting.
Censored: 薄熙来案件是审查过的司法机关人员可以旁听，不能电
视直播，微博截取直播。还是留下痕迹。 The observers of Bo Xilai
scandal are judicial authorities who passed investigations. There is no live




My friend just asked some questions onWeibo:When Bo Xilai slappedWang
Lijun in the face in the Chongqing office, should he be accused of assaulting
a police officer? If Wang Lijun shot him, would that be a legitimate use of
gun? How should we answer these questions?
Uncensored: 薄熙来始终不认罪，戴械具，老周认罪，不戴，好看
点。
Bo Xilai still isn’t pleading guilty. And he’s cuffed. Old Zhao pleaded guilty,






[He] calmly accepted the charges and pleaded guilty. But regrets wait for
no one. Since July 2014 till now, within only a year, his hair has turned gray
already. Bo Xilai looked quiet, gentle and peaceful when he was waiting
for the verdict. However, failing to live up to one’s responsibility, failing
to manage one’s behavior, poor self-discipline and not contented, are what




No wonder why I felt both familiar and unfamiliar when I first heard the
name "Bo Xilai" – the Hebrews were behind it.
3.3 Data Preprocessing
Name of author, friend tags and reblogged content were removed
from all data. Hashtags were preserved as they might provide useful
information. All non-textual information such as images and videos
were also discarded. Since the Chinese language does not have
word boundaries, word segmentation has to be carried out before
certain linguistic features can be extracted. The word segmenter
by Aihanyu Corpus (http://www.aihanyu.org/cncorpus/index.aspx)
was used to segment all the data.
4 LINGUISTIC FEATURES
4.1 LIWC
LIWC ([13, 14]) is a program built on dominant theories in psychol-
ogy, business, and medicine. It analyzes text on a word-by-word
basis, calculating percentage of words that match certain language
dimensions such as psychological processes (affect, drives etc.) and
linguistic processes (adverbs, prepositions etc.). The idea is that cer-
tain words are strong indicators of people’s emotional and cognitive
worlds. Each word can belong to more than one category.
We used the Chinese LIWC to extract the frequency of word cat-
egories. The Chinese LIWC dictionary was developed by [3]. It was
built by first translating from the English LIWC, and then further
developed and modified to accommodate the linguistic differences
between English and Chinese. Therefore, the Chinese Dictionary
contains some categories that are not included in the English Dictio-
nary, such as prepEnd (words that are appended to the end of other
words), quanUnit (classifier/quantifier) and so on. The frequency
score of each category is used as one feature.
4.2 Sensitive Keywords
We collected a list of keywords that are regarded as sensitive
in mainland China and counted the frequency of keywords in
each piece of data. The first source is a list of blacklisted key-
words provided by Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_
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of_blacklisted_keywords_in_China) and the second source is a list
of sensitive Sina Weibo search terms provided by China Digital
Times (https://chinadigitaltimes.net/china/sensitive-words-series/).
Since accessibility of searches change from time to time, China Dig-
ital Times tested the "searchability" of each keyword and recorded
the date of testing for reference. We collected keywords that were
tested between January 1, 2015 to March 1, 2016, a period that over-
lapped with our data. A total of 598 keywords were collected from
the two sources. Sensitive keywords were found in 31 out of 152
uncensored data and 60 out of 192 censored data. We implemented
this feature as a relative frequency (normalized by the total number
of word tokens in a post).
4.3 Sentiment
We used two Chinese sentiment analyzers to investigate sentiment
presented in the data.
4.4 BosonNLP
For each piece of data, BosonNLP (https://bosonnlp.com/ ) provides
a percentage score of non-negative sentiment, and another percent-
age score of negative sentiment. The two scores have a sum of 1.
We selected two different training models for analysis – the General
model and the Weibo model. Each model has been trained with
different corpus. The General model applies to general Chinese
texts and the Weibo model is trained with texts commonly found
on Weibo. The average negative sentiment percentage obtained for
censored texts are 53.9% for General model and 46.0% for Weibo
model. The same percentage scores obtained for uncensored texts
are 49.3% and 36.6% respectively.
4.5 BaiduAI
BaiduAI https://ai.baidu.com/ was used to obtain another set of
sentiment scores. It provides a positive sentiment percentage score
and a negative sentiment percentage score for each post, which
also sum up to 1. The average negative percentage are 64.9% and
56.3% for censored and uncensored texts respectively.
4.6 Ngrams
We extract unigrams, bigrams and trigrams of words for each blog
post. Before extracting ngrams, we apply a list of stop words that
contains some single-character function words and punctuation.
We included all the ngrams whose raw frequency was greater than
3. To account for the differences in blog post lengths, the ngrams
are normalized.
5 AUTOMATIC EXPERIMENTS
We extract a total of 408 features as described above. We build
Naive Bayes classifiers [4] with various feature combinations and
evaluate each performance with 10-fold cross-validation. Table 1
summarizes the results. All Punctuations and OtherP are both LIWC
features. All Punctuations is the overall count of 10 common punc-
tuations such as question mark, quotes, comma etc. plus a group
of less common punctuations (OtherP) such as ellipsis and percent
sign. The LIWC Summary includes WC (word count), WPS (average
sentence length in words), Dic (percent of target words captured by
the LIWC dictionary) and Other Grammar (verb, adjectives, quan-
tifiers etc). The best 17 features were selected with the standard
Information Gain feature selection algorithm [12] and were also
evaluated with 10-fold cross-validation.
Table 1: Classification results for the Bo Xilai dataset
Feature Combination (# of features) Censored Uncensored
Acc Pre Rec F1 Pre Rec F1
OtherP (1) 0.55 0.57 0.92 0.70 0.32 0.05 0.09
All Punctuation (11) 0.66 0.66 0.85 0.74 0.66 0.40 0.50
Sensitive keywords (1) 0.53 0.71 0.31 0.43 0.47 0.82 0.60
AllPunc+Sensitive keywords (12) 0.65 0.67 0.76 0.71 0.60 0.50 0.55
LIWC Summary (4) 0.69 0.65 1.00 0.79 0.98 0.28 0.43
LIWC Psychological Processes (49) 0.62 0.77 0.50 0.60 0.54 0.79 0.64
LIWC Linguistic Processes (30) 0.60 0.72 0.49 0.58 0.52 0.75 0.61
LIWC all (95) 0.68 0.76 0.64 0.70 0.60 0.72 0.65
LIWC all+keywords (97) 0.67 0.76 0.64 0.69 0.59 0.72 0.65
Baidu Sentiment (3) 0.57 0.61 0.72 0.66 0.50 0.38 0.43
Boson Sentiment (4) 0.57 0.63 0.60 0.62 0.49 0.51 0.50
Baidu+Boson (7) 0.57 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.49 0.49 0.49
ngrams (299) 0.51 0.60 0.42 0.50 0.44 0.62 0.52
All features (408) 0.69 0.76 0.69 0.72 0.62 0.70 0.66
LIWC+Baidu+Boson+keywords (102) 0.72 0.79 0.69 0.74 0.65 0.75 0.70
Best features (17) 0.79 0.80 0.85 0.83 0.78 0.71 0.75
The best 17 features selected by the IG algorithm are listed
below along with the Domain each of them belong to.
(1) feel (words related to physical feeling and touch) Perceptual
(2) informal (informal language markers (assents, fillers, swear
words, netspeak) Informal Language
(3) prepEnd (postpositions, e.g., words expressing time and
space e.g.中,为止,之外) Function Words
(4) (dictionary words, i.e., percent of words captured by the
LIWC dictionary) General
(5) nonflu (nonfluencies) Informal Language
(6) particle (function word associated with another word or
phrase to impart meaning.) Function Words
(7) assent (words like agree, OK, yes) Informal Language
(8) see (words like view, see, seen) Perceptual
(9) body (words describing human body, e.g., cheek, hands, spit)
Biological
(10) modal-pa (Modal particles) used at the end of sentences to
indicate mood, or attitude. e.g.了,吗,吧 Function Words
(11) general-pa (general particle) particle that is not modal e.g.
地,得,来着 Function Words
(12) AllPunc (all punctuation) General
(13) ppron (personal pronouns) Function Words
(14) quanunit (Chinese-specific quantity unit, e.g., quantifier位,
元,名) Function Words
(15) swear (swear words) Informal Language
(16) WC (Word count) General
(17) WPS (average sentence length) General
6 DISCUSSION
We found it interesting that neither sensitive keywords nor sen-
timent analysis turned out to be strong indicators of censorship.
To get a better understanding of the language differences between
censored and uncensored text (which feature is more associated
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Figure 1: Precision and recall tradeoff (best features)
with which class), for each of the 17 best feature, we subtract the
average value of all censored posts from their corresponding uncen-
sored values. A positive results indicates an association between a
feature and uncensored class, whereas a negative results indicate
an association between a feature and the censored class. The results
are shown in Figure 2. All the differences shown in the graphs are
statistically significant (two tailed unpaired t-test, p<0.5).
Features that are categorized by LIWC as Function Words, Infor-
mal Language, and Feel (Perceptual) seem to be the best indicators
of censored content. While we cannot make any strong claims at
this point, it seems that censored language contains more words
that are richer in semantic variety and are more informal in nature.
This is evidenced by its strong association with the Dic feature
which represents the various semantic classes and dimensions of
the LIWC dictionary. The use of informal language (informal, nonflu,
swear) is also more associated with censored texts. The strong asso-
ciation with particles (which are frequently used to indicate mood
(modal-pa) and relationship (general-pa) in Chinese) might entail
some characteristics of censored language. Since Chinese general
particles are typically used to specify relationship, it suggests that
censored language might tend to mark relationships among people,
matter etc. Modal particles are usually used to signify speaker’s
mood, attitude and tone. This means that censored language might
tend to be more subjective. We hypothesize that sentiment does not
contribute to the classification because it indicates only positive
and negative, but not the intensity of opinions. We plan to address
this issue in our future work. We also notice that words that are
related to the sense see are indicators of the uncensored content,
while words related to feel are associated with the censored con-
tent. Upon a closer look at the data and the words that fall under
each category, we can see that for feel, many words are used as
metaphors to express psychological feelings despite the fact that
their literal sense refers to physical feelings. As for see, many words
are used in their literal sense in the uncensored data e.g. showcase,
depict, discover etc. They tend to be more objective in reporting
the Bo Xilai incident, instead of being very opinionated on it.
Our findings go along with [6]’s Collective Action Potential
(CAP) theory, which states that it is not controversial content that
gets censored, but content that has CAP. In our case, sensitive
keywords (the indicators of controversy) were not strong indicators
of censorship.
We realize that we are workingwith a relatively small dataset and
therefore, our results are preliminary. To get an idea of whether our
Figure 2: Language differences of censored and uncensored
posts.
Figure 3: The relationship between training set size and best
classifier performance (with 10-fold cross-validation)
classifier can improve with the increase of the training examples,
we partitioned our entire dataset into 10%, 20% etc. and evaluate
the performance of the best classifier on each partition. The learn-
ing curve depicted in Figure 3 suggests that if we collect a larger
corpus, the classifier’s performance will likely increase. We are in
the process of experimenting with other classifiers, expanding the
corpus to include more topics, and also extracting more linguistic
features.We also notice the importance of the trade-off between precision
and recall for our task. Figure 1 illustrates which feature provides
the highest recall and precision for censored and uncensored posts.
Eventually we want to make it more difficult for the censors to
detect content that may be “deemed inappropriate". We therefore
want our model to have good coverage, which suggests improving
the recall. We will explore this matter in future work.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper we described a pilot study in which we built a model to
classify censored and uncensored social media posts from mainland
China. Our corpus deliberately contains only one topic, the Bo Xilai
scandal. Our goal was to explore whether linguistic features could
be effective in distinguishing censored and uncensored content.
Our study suggests that subjective information, such as expressions
of mood and feeling, and informal language can likely be indicators
of censorable content.
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